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INSURANCE LAW
INTRODUCTION
Insurance law functions to regulate the relationship between the
risks insurance carriers assume and the responsibilities assumed by those
they insure.' As insurance policies become more complex, the balance
between these responsibilities shift and either insurers or insureds may
call upon courts to assist in striking new balances. This survey examines
how the Tenth Circuit interpreted several insurance coverage issues dur-
ing the survey period.2
Part I of this survey provides a brief historical background of insur-
ance law. Part II examines courts' interpretations of motor carrier poli-
cies governed by the MCS-90 Endorsement, which the Tenth Circuit
interpreted in Adams v. Royal Indemnity Co.' Part III of this survey ex-
amines the effect of temporary substitute vehicle policy provisions which
the Tenth Circuit addressed in Houston General Insurance Co. v. Ameri-
can Fence Co.' Part IV discusses Hays v. Jackson National Life Insur-
ance Co.,' in which the Tenth Circuit focused on the issue of misrepre-
sentations on insurance applications.' Part V covers the Tenth Circuit's
treatment of pollution exclusions under comprehensive general liability
policies in Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America.'
I. BACKGROUND
Americans annually pay over one trillion dollars in insurance pre-
miums in exchange for peace of mind and financial security from risks of
future financial loss or harm.' Many business transactions involve or
implicate insurance in some form or manner.9 Insurance law, therefore,
plays an important role in daily business transactions.
The idea of insurance can be traced back centuries before Christ."'
Recognizing the hazards of their trade, Phoenician merchants engaged in
commerce by sea and they provided each other with mutual assistance."
From the twelfth through sixteenth centuries, Italian merchants devel-
1. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1986) (describing the major functions of insurance law).
2. The survey period covered cases decided between September 1996 and August 1997.
3. 99 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 1996).
4. 115 F.3d 805 (10th Cir. 1997).
5. 105 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997).
6. Hays, 105 F.3d at 583.
7. 123 F.3d 1333 (10th Cir. 1997).
8. I ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES'S APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 1.1,
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oped marine insurance.1 2 During this time, a body of law developed to
regulate insurance and other commercial matters.
3
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, seafaring merchants
developed the business of insuring goods at Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse
in London." Lloyd's coffeehouse evolved into a market for insurance."
Over time, various lines of insurance evolved."' Distinct classifications of
marine, life, fire and casualty insurance developed.'
Insurance in the United States developed from the English practice
originating at Lloyd's coffeehouse.'8 Traditionally, the United States
government left regulation of the insurance industry to the indivivual
states.'9 As law regulating interstate commerce evolved, however, so did
the federal government's role in regulating the insurance industry.' Fed-
eral regulation seeks to prevent unfair claims practices and to promote
adequate coverage in common situations.2' As litigation involving cover-
age interpretation has exploded in the last quarter century,' the task of
keeping up with developments in the field of insurance law can be
daunting.
II. EXPANSION OF COVERAGE UNDER THE MCS-90 ENDORSEMENT
A. Background
The Interstate Commerce Act granted the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) the power to make regulations ensuring that motor
carriers be fully responsible for the operation of vehicles certified to
them.' In response to this congressional mandate, the ICC developed
regulations which required that every lease entered into by an ICC-
licensed carrier stipulate that the carrier maintain exclusive possession of
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 5-6.
15. Thomas W. Wilson, How Lloyd's Functions: A Primer on Operations, in LLOYD'S AND
THE LONDON INSURANCE MARKET 1994, at 7, 14 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 706, 1994).
16. 1 HOLMES, supra note 8, § 1.2, at 6.
17. Id. at 8.
18. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATIONS OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAW AND
STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS § 1.1, at 5 (1994).
19. Id.§26.1.1,at580.
20. See id. at 581.
21. See John H. Mathias & John D. Shugrue, Emerging Issues: The Policyholder Perspective,
in INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION 1993, at 9, 11 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 477, 1993).
22. Id.
23. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 357, 362 (10th Cir.
1989) (quoting Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 304(e) (1956)). The ICC was abolished by
Congress in 1995. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 803 (1995). Congress transferred the
ICC's authority to regulate motor carriers to the Department of Transportation. See 49 U.S.C. §
13501 et seq. (Supp. I 1996).
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and control over leased equipment. The regulations also mandate that the
carrier assume total responsibility for the equipment's operation for the
duration of the lease.'
To ensure that motor carriers complied with these regulations, the
ICC developed the MCS-90 Endorsement.' This endorsement to a motor
carrier's insurance policy negates any policy terms that limit the insur-
ance carrier's liability.' The MCS-90 Endorsement ensures that a motor
carrier will carry adequate insurance coverage and holds a negligent car-
rier financially responsible.' It requires a carrier to maintain a minimum
level of coverage for environmental restoration, bodily injury and prop-
erty damage liability.' It also requires that the motor carrier obtain a
minimum level of financial responsibility, which relieves the motor car-
rier's insurance company from unlimited liability.'
Federal circuit courts have interpreted the scope and effect of this
endorsement. In Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Guaranty Na-
tional Insurance Co.," the Tenth Circuit analyzed the issue of primacy
between two insurers under the terms of the endorsement.' The court
held that insurers governed by the endorsement may enter into contrac-
tual agreements allocating ultimate liability among themselves so long as
such agreements do not adversely affect the rights of the public and ship-
pers.2 The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of primacy between insurers
in Canal Insurance Co. v. First General Insurance Co." In Canal, the
court held that the endorsement expanded coverage for third-party mem-
bers of the public to include vehicles not listed on the motor carrier's
insurance policy, but that it did not expand coverage for purposes of dis-
putes among insurers over ultimate liability.'
During the survey period, in Adams v. Royal Indemnity Co.," the
Tenth Circuit addressed the question of how far the endorsement extends
to cover a vehicle not listed in an insurance policy. In Adams, the court
addressed whether the endorsement could preclude a policy from limit-
ing coverage based on the definition of an insured as one who "owns,
hires, or borrows" vehicles listed on a policy. 6
24. Empire, 868 F.2d at 362.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 363.
27. 49 C.F.R. § 387.15 (1996).
28. Motor Carriers of Property Minimum Amounts of Bodily Injury & Property Damage
Liability Insurance, 132 I.C.C. 948, 952 (1982).
29. Id.
30. 868 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1989).
31. Empire, 868 F.2d at 361.
32. Id. at 366.
33. 889 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1989).
34. Canal, 889 F.2d at 611.
35. 99 F.3d 964 (1Oth Cir. 1996).
36. Adams, 99 F.3d at 970.
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B. Adams v. Royal Indemnity Co.
1. Facts
In Adams, Royal Indemnity Company (Royal) issued two pertinent
insurance policies." First, Royal issued a policy to Thomas, a member of
the partnership that owned Trailer 701 and had leased the trailer to Gei-
gley." Second, Royal issued a policy to Geigley.3' Both policies included
the MCS-90 Endorsement.'
Geigley lent Trailer 701 to his son-in-law, Hofer.' In January 1986,
Hofer was driving a tractor owned by his brother and pulling Trailer 701
when a load of steel trusses fell from the rig, causing an accident that
severely injured Adams."2 Adams sued Hofer in state court and obtained a
default judgment of approximately one million dollars when Hofer failed
to appear."3
Because Adams was unable to collect the judgment from Hofer,
Adams brought a diversity action against Royal in federal district court."
The district court found that neither policy afforded coverage because
Trailer 701 did not constitute a covered auto under the policies' defimi-
tions.' Adams appealed to the Tenth Circuit.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed two issues on appeal. First, the court
considered whether either or both of the two basic policies covered
Trailer 701." Second, the court addressed whether a driver whom the
basic policies did not cover was covered under the terms of the endorse-
ment.'
Both basic policies limited liability coverage to automobiles owned
by the insured and listed on the policy.' Because neither Thomas nor
Geigley owned Trailer 701 and neither policy listed Trailer 701 as a cov-




41. Id. at 965.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 965-66.
44. Id. at 967.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 968.
48. Id. at 969.
49. Id. at 969-70.
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ered automobile, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that Trailer 701 was not covered by either basic policy.'
The court found, however, that the MCS-90 Endorsement had the
effect of expanding coverage to Hofer under Geigley's policy." It found
that the endorsement indirectly modified Royal's policy definition of
"insured," which limited coverage to a person using a "covered auto."52
Based on this modification, the Tenth Circuit found that Hofer consti-
tuted an "insured" under Geigley's policy." The court held Royal liable
to Adams for the judgment he obtained against Hofer.'
C. Other Circuits
Three other circuits interpreted the effect of the MCS-90 Endorse-
ment on coverage during the survey period. The Ninth Circuit addressed
the scope of the endorsement's coverage in Harco National Insurance
Co. v. Bobac Trucking, Inc." In Harco, a self-employed trucker acting as
an independent contractor for Bobac Trucking Company, delivered a
trailer and shipping container owned by China Ocean Shipping Company
(Cosco) to a warehouse also owned by Cosco.' The trucker parked the
trailer so that it jutted out into a street.5 ' Burdick was injured when a ve-
hicle in which he was a passenger struck the parked trailer. 8
Burdick sued Bobac and Cosco in state court.59 Bobac sought cover-
age from its insurer Harco National Insurance Company (Harco). '
Harco, however, denied coverage because its policy with Bobac did not
list the trailer as a covered vehicle. ' The action was removed to federal
court, and the parties settled.' Harco contributed a portion of Bobac's
share of the settlement pursuant to the MCS-90 Endorsement, after
which Harco sought a declaration that the endorsement did not require it
to pay.' The district court granted Harco's summary judgment motion.'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the
50. Id. at 971.
51. Id. The court found that Thomas's policy did not apply because at the time of the accident
Thomas neither owned nor had control over the trailer. Id. Rather, the partnership of which Thomas
was a member owned the trailer. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 972.
55. 107 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 1997).








64. Id. at 735.
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MCS-90 Endorsement did not expand coverage to automobiles not listed
under the main policy."
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the endorsement's effect on coverage
in John Deere Insurance Co. v. Truckin' U.S.A.' That case involved the
death of Mr. and Mrs. Kurocik as a result of an accident with a tractor-
trailer rig owned by Truckin' U.S.A.' Their heirs sued multiple defen-
dants, including Copp Trucking, Inc., whose name appeared on the trac-
tor rig.' Transport Insurance Company insured Copp Trucking.' Trans-
port settled the Kurocik heirs' claims against Copp." Truckin' U.S.A.
carried an insurance policy with John Deere Insurance Company."
Transport sought reimbursement from John Deere for the settlement
amount it paid on behalf of Copp." John Deere brought a declaratory
action in federal district court. 3 The district court granted John Deere's
motion for summary judgment based on the finding that Copp did not
qualify as an insured under John Deere's policy."
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of John Deere." Because the policy did not name Copp
Trucking as an insured, the Fifth Circuit held that the MCS-90 Endorse-
ment provided no basis for relief. The court stated that when an insur-
ance policy does not provide coverage for non-listed vehicles, except to
third-party members of the public through operation of the endorsement,
the policy provides no coverage for purposes of disputes among insurers
over ultimate liability."6
The Sixth Circuit interpreted coverage under the endorsement dif-
ferently in Prestige Casualty Co. v. Michigan Mutual Insurance Co.' In
Prestige, Bogle leased a vehicle to Wolverine Expediting, Inc. (Wolver-
ine) in June 1985." Prestige Casualty Company (Prestige) insured Bogle,
and Michigan Mutual Insurance Company (Michigan Mutual) insured
Wolverine. 9 Pursuant to the MCS-90 Endorsement attached to its policy
with Michigan Mutual,' Wolverine was liable for all damages arising out
65. Id. at 736.
66. 122 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 1997).





72. Id. at 271-72.
73. Id. at 272.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 275.
76. Id.
77. 99 F.3d 1340 (6th Cir. 1996).
78. Prestige, 99 F.3d at 1343.
79. Id. at 1342.
80. Id. at 1347.
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of operation of the vehicle during the lease period." Bogle hired driver
Gregory Freed and paid part of his wages for each trip."2 Freed struck a
vehicle in October 1985, seriously injuring the driver." Just prior to the
accident, however, Bogle borrowed the truck back from Wolverine."
Bogle and Freed settled the case, and Prestige paid the settlement
amount." A state court held that Bogle was indemnified against Wolver-
ine, and ordered Freed to pay Wolverine the full amount of the settle-
ment." Prestige filed a declaratory judgment action against Michigan
Mutual seeking a determination that Michigan Mutual's policy provided
primary coverage for payment of Bogle's judgment against Wolverine
and Wolverine's judgment against Freed." Finding that both policies
provided excess coverage only, the district court apportioned liability on
a pro rata basis in accordance with Michigan law."
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit determined that the endorsement ne-
gated limiting provisions in the policy to which it was attached, but did
not establish primary liability over other policies that are also primary by
their own terms.' Based on the language of the pertinent policies and the
Michigan law governing insurance contracts, the Sixth Circuit found
both policies were primary? Since both policies contained identical ap-
portionment schemes, the court held the policies to be primary on a pro
rata basis."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit and other circuit courts give great weight to the
public policy rationale behind the MCS-90 Endorsement, which is to
protect the public from unscrupulous or negligent motor carriers who
may not carry insurance on their vehicles. Such carriers would thus ex-
pose the public to the costs of accidents caused by those vehicles.' The
court in Adams emphasized that the plaintiff in the action was "a member
of the general public, which is precisely the group that is intended to be
protected by this . . . endorsement," 9' and followed closely the observa-
81. Id.; see also 49 C.F.R. § 1057.12(c)(1) (1996) (stating that the lessee shall have exclusive
possession and responsibility for the duration of the lease).
82. Prestige, 99 F.3d at 1343.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1344.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1345.
88. Id. at 1347.
89. Id. at 1348.
90. Id. at 1352.
91. Id.
92. See Adams v. Royal Indem. Co., 99 F.3d 964,968 (10th Cir. 1996).
93. Id. at 969.
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tion the court made in Empire that the purpose of the MCS-90 Endorse-
ment is to provide protection to the public."
The court's decision in Adams demonstrates its willingness to inter-
pret the endorsement to provide relatively broad protection to the public
as against motor carriers. This stance is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's
holding in CanaP5 and its dictum in John Deere," which interpreted the
endorsement as expanding coverage to include a non-listed vehicle when
such a vehicle was involved in an accident which harmed a third party.
The stance is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harco,
which stated that the endorsement does not expand coverage to vehicles
not listed on the policy to which the endorsement applies.'
Though at least three circuits appear willing to interpret the en-
dorsement relatively broadly, the courts are willing to expand the en-
dorsement's scope only so far. The Tenth Circuit is unwilling to find that
the endorsement allocates primacy among insurers, which in effect
would make one insurance carrier the "insured" of another." Neither are
the Fifth, Sixth, nor the Ninth Circuits willing to take the scope of the
endorsement to the extent that it indemnifies one insurer against
another.' Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit set no prohibition on insurers
allocating among themselves liability which may arise under the en-
dorsement."° Insurers, therefore, may find some flexibility when called
upon to extend coverage in an uncontemplated situation.
M11. TEMiPORARY SUBSTITUTE VEHICLES
A. Background
Collision insurance usually covers damage occurring during the
operation of an insured vehicle for any legitimate purpose not expressly
excluded by the terms of the policy. '°1 Automobile insurance policies
may afford automatic coverage for newly acquired automobiles."m Insur-
94. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 357, 362-63 (10th Cir.
1989).
95. Canal Ins. Co. v. First Gen. Ins. Co., 889 F.2d 604,611 (5th Cir. 1989).
96. John Deere Ins. Co. v. Tnickin' U.S.A., 122 F.3d 270, 275 (5th Cir. 1997).
97. Harco Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bobac Trucking Inc., 107 F.3d 733,736 (9th Cir. 1997).
98. See Adams v. Royal Indem. Co., 99 F.3d 964, 969 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing the
purpose of the endorsement as protection of the public); Empire, 868 F.2d at 367 (stating that the
endorsement does not absolve the liability of an insurer that would otherwise provide primary
coverage).
99. See Harco, 107 F.3d at 736 (stating in dictum that the endorsement allows insurers to
aggregate costs); Prestige Cas. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 1340, 1348 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding the endorsement imposed no primacy); Canal, 889 F.2d at 611 (holding that the
endorsement provides no coverage for disputes among insurers over ultimate liability).
100. See Adams, 99 F.3d at 969; Empire, 868 F.2d at 366.
101. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 172 (1980), available in Westlaw, 7 AMJUR




ance carriers also provide automatic coverage to insureds when policy-
holders require the use of a non-owned vehicle in certain
circumstances."
Standard automobile insurance policies usually include a temporary
substitute vehicle provision.'" The insurer designs such clauses to pro-
vide the policyholder with continuity of liability protection when the
insured vehicle becomes unavailable for use and the policyholder tempo-
rarily uses a non-owned vehicle in its place."5 The outcome of several
threshold inquiries determines whether the non-owned vehicle consti-
tutes a "temporary substitute" under the insurance policy terms."(6
One such inquiry determines the meaning of "temporary" within the
context of a policy. Many courts construe the word "temporary" to mean
any use that is not permanent in nature."' Whether an insured uses a sub-
stitute vehicle temporarily is a matter of subjective intent."' Accordingly,
the courts look to what is reasonable under the circumstances to deter-
mine whether the use is "temporary."'" °
Another inquiry looks to the circumstances under which the use of a
substitute vehicle occurs. Many insurance policies stipulate that the in-
sured vehicle must be "withdrawn from normal use" as a result of break-
down, repair, servicing, loss or destruction." By limiting the circum-
stances under which a policyholder may use a substitute vehicle, the in-
surer protects itself from excess exposure which results when a policy-
holder regularly uses a vehicle not listed in a policy."' Parties to insur-
ance contracts have called upon courts to interpret the meaning of "with-
drawn from normal use."
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the phrase in Western Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Norman,"' a case in which an employee used his personal
vehicle during the course of a business trip."' After an accident occurred
involving the vehicle, the employee sought coverage under his em-
ployer's automobile policy, contending that the employee used his vehi-
103. Id. § 236.
104. James L. Isham, Annotation, Construction and Application of Substitute Provision of
Automobile Liability Policy, 42 A.L.R. 4th 1145, 1153-54 (1985).
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1154-57.
107. Id. at 1156-57.
108. 12 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 526 (Ronald A.
Anderson & Mark S. Rhodes eds., 2d ed. 1981).
109. See id. at 527. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the use of the involved
vehicle was temporary even though the insured borrowed the vehicle from his mother on four or five
separate occasions. McKee v. Exhange Ins. Ass'n, 120 So. 2d 690, 692-93 (Ala. 1960).
110. 12 COUCH, supra note 108, at 511.
11l. See id.
112. 197 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1952).
113. Western, 197 F.2d at 68.
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cle as a temporary substitute for the company truck."" The court held that
the employee's vehicle did not constitute a substitute vehicle because the
employee had previously used his own car extensively in almost every
phase of conducting business."5
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit addressed the meaning
of "temporary substitute" and "out of service" under a provision of a
standard automobile insurance policy in Houston General Insurance Co.
v. American Fence Co."6 No other circuit courts addressed the temporary
substitute vehicle provision during the survey period.
B. Houston General Ins. Co. v. American Fence Co.
1. Facts
In December 1991, Jim Woodie, President of American Fence
Company, and John Woodie, his brother and an employee of American
Fence, drove Jim's 1986 pickup truck to a dealership where they pur-
chased a new 1992 pickup truck for American Fence."' They planned to
drive both vehicles to another location and leave the new truck for in-
stallation of a cellular phone."' En route, John was involved in an acci-
dent while driving the 1986 truck."9
American Fence carried an automobile insurance policy with
Houston General Insurance Company.'20 Although the policy listed the
new 1992 truck, it did not list the 1986 truck as a covered vehicle.'2 ' Jim
Woodie did not carry any insurance on the 1986 truck.'" American Fence
sought coverage from Houston General claiming that the 1986 pickup
truck was a substitute vehicle under the terms of the policy.'"
Faced with the demand from American Fence to defend and indem-
nify, Houston General sought declaratory relief in federal district court.'24
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Houston Gen-
eral.'" American Fence appealed to the Tenth Circuit.'
26
114. Id.
115. Id. at 69; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 558 A.2d
1244, 1247 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (holding that a substitute vehicle clause provided coverage
for only one substitute vehicle at a time).
116. 115 F.3d 805 (10th Cir. 1997).












The Tenth Circuit focused its analysis on the temporary substitute
vehicle provision of Houston General's insurance contract with Ameri-
can Fence.'" The court found no indication that the plaintiff used the
1986 truck in place of the 1992 truck.'" Because the Woodies had
planned to drop off the 1992 truck and return to company headquarters in
the 1986 truck, they required the use of both vehicles.'" In addition, the
court noted that the pertinent policy required a covered vehicle be "out of
service" due to breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction in order
for a substitute vehicle to qualify for coverage.
3 0
Applying Oklahoma law to interpret the contract, the Tenth Circuit
found that the terms of the policy were unambiguous.'"' Therefore, the
court accepted the plain and ordinary meaning of the contract to deter-
mine the intention of the parties at the time they entered into it.3
The appellant relied on Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. West'3 to
argue that a covered vehicle need not be completely disabled or with-
drawn from normal use to qualify as a substitute vehicle for coverage.'
3
1
In West, the policyholder used his father's vehicle because the tires on
the covered vehicle were dangerously worn.'3 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court found that the policy provision did not require that the insured's
covered auto be unsuitable for all use . 6 The court found that because the
covered vehicle represented a danger, if driven, it constituted a vehicle
withdrawn from "normal" use, as opposed to "possible" use, and was
covered under the temporary substitute vehicle policy provision. '
The Tenth Circuit rejected the relevance of the West decision.' 8 In-
stead, the court analyzed the insured's purpose for using the 1986 truck
in place of the 1992 truck.' Unlike the insured in West, Jim Woodie
intended to use the listed vehicle at the same time he was to use the "sub-
stitute" truck.'4" Even though the 1992 truck was to be out of service, it
was not yet out of service when the accident occurred.'"
127. Id. at 806-07.
128. Id. at 808.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 807.
132. Id.
133. 351 P.2d 398 (Okla. 1959).
134. Houston, 115 F.3d at 807.
135. West, 351 P.2d at 399.
136. Id. at 400.
137. Id. at 401.
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Because Woodie did not use the 1986 truck as a substitute for the
1992 truck, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the
1986 truck did not constitute a "temporary substitute" under the policy. 2
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit justly decided Houston General. The purpose for
the substitution provision is to recognize and permit the insured's opera-
tions to continue should a vehicle listed on the policy be temporarily out
of commission. 3 However, an insurer must limit the coverage on the use
of such non-listed vehicles in order to establish a fair policy rate.'" Fail-
ure to restrict the use of vehicles not listed on a policy would result in
liability risks uncontemplated by the insurer."
The Tenth Circuit's finding followed prior interpretations of the
"out of service" meaning. The majority of case law on this issue indi-
cates that a listed vehicle need not be withdrawn from all use in order to
be considered withdrawn.'" The majority of courts have held that in order
for the substitute vehicle provision to apply, a listed vehicle must merely
be withdrawn from normal use.'
The Tenth Circuit may have reached a different conclusion had the
accident occurred while the 1992 truck was unavailable for use during
the installation of the cellular phone. However, the accident would have
had to occur during a time when the company had substituted use of the
1986 truck for the 1992 truck's normal business use.
Houston General properly protected the insurer's interest in allo-
cating risk by recognizing that Woodie paid no premium to cover the use
of the unlisted truck.'" Insurance premium rates should reflect an- appro-
priate allocation of risk between insurer and insured. Allocation of risk,
however, is not the only factor that determines insurance premium rates.
Insurance fraud is a threat to automobile insurance companies."9 Al-
though the precise financial impact of fraud is impossible to calculate,
the estimated costs of fraud have risen over the years, reaching billions
of dollars." Insurers then pass these losses on to consumers.
142. Id. at 809.
143. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 236 (1980), available in Westlaw, 7 AMJUR
AUTO INS § 236.
144. Id.
145. Houston, 115 F.3d at 807.
146. Isham, supra note 104, at 1154.
147. Id.
148. Houston, 115 F.3d at 806.
149. Lisa Moore, Note, National Insurance Association v. Peach: An Analysis of Extended
Issues To Be Raised by Insurers, Insureds and Injured Third Parties, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 375 (1997).
150. Edward L. Schrenk & Jonathon B. Palmquist, Fraud and its Effects on the Insurance
Industry, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 23, 23-24 (1997).
151. Id. at 24.
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IV. MISREPRESENTATIONS ON INSURANCE APPLICATIONS
A. Background
Policy applications provide data necessary to enable an insurer to
determine whether to accept the risk of insuring an applicant, as well as
information which allows the insurer to set a premium.' Although false
information on a policy application could result in mistaken issuance of a
policy or incorrect rates, more than one out of five adults believe that
lying on an insurance application is an acceptable practice.'
When a prospective insured misrepresents material information in
the policy application, the insurer is generally permitted to deny cover-
age of the submitted claim, reform the policy, or rescind the policy.'" If
the insurer rescinds the policy, the policy is rendered void ab initio."' In
that case, the insurer must usually return the insured's paid premiums
with interest." State law determines what constitutes sufficient fraud or
misrepresentation sufficient to enable a court to rescind the policy.' 7
A material false representation' would reasonably influence the
insurer's decision whether to accept the risk, or accept it under different
conditions.'" The requisite proof of materiality varies among jurisdic-
tions. Under an objective approach, the insurer must show that "a pru-
dent insurer would regard the true facts as increasing its risk under the
policy."'" Under the subjective approach, the insurer must show that it
would have done something different with the policy, if it had known the
true facts. 6'
In addition to the material false representation requirement, some
jurisdictions require that an insurer prove an intent to deceive in order to
rescind the policy.' 2 This requirement poses two problems for the insur-
152. 7 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 10 (Ronald A. Anderson
ed., 2d ed. 1981).
153. Joel P. Williams, Note, Insurance Law-Protecting the Public Under Maryland's
Compulsory Vehicle Insurance Scheme: The Abrogation of an Insurer's Common Law Right To Void
an Insurance Contract Ab Initio for a Material Misrepresentation in the Policy Application, 25 U.
BALT. L. REV. 289, 289 (1996).
154. Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and
Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues, 51 BUS. LAW. 573,584 (1996).
155. Id. at 585.
156. Id.
157. P. Jay Wiker & Edward K. Lenci, Utmost Good Faith and Rescission, in REINSURANCE
LAW & PRACTICE: NEW LEGAL AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT 147, 223 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 756, 1997).
158. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1012, at 1018 (1982).
159. See Brunnemer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 14 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ind. 1938).
160. Sheila J. Carpenter, The Impact of AIDS on Life and Health Insurance Fraud, 93 A.L.I.
229, 232 (1996).
161. Id.
162. See Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 712 F.2d 459, 462 (1 Ith Cir.
1983); White v. Medico Life Ins. Co., 327 N.W.2d 606, 609-10 (Neb. 1982).
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ance industry.'" First, because many courts have held that the intent to
deceive cannot be proven as a matter of law, the insurer cannot dispose
of potentially costly litigation with summary judgment.'" Second, the
insurer bears a substantial burden of proof in order to establish that the
insured acted with a malicious or evil purpose."
Courts in many jurisdictions which require automobile insurance
coverage have held that an insurer cannot void a policy ab initio for fraud
or misrepresentation in the application to avoid payment to a third-party
claimant.'" In Teeter v. Allstate Insurance Co.,'6' a New York court de-
scribed the rationale for this policy.'" The court reasoned that the aim of
a compulsory insurance scheme is to provide continuous liability cover-
age for all vehicles registered in the state and that a supervening public
interest restricts the rights of the parties once the policy is in force.'" In
Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Clay,70 the Kansas Supreme Court
held that public policy favors the compensation of innocent, injured third
parties in cases where fraud may otherwise preclude coverage."'
The courts do not, however, always uphold coverage under an in-
surance policy when an innocent third party is injured. Most courts draw
the line when the policyholder procures insurance for an accident that
has already occurred,' 2 reasoning that coverage would provide an incen-
tive for motorists not to purchase required insurance.'
Insurance fraud can be very difficult to prove.' Although insurance
agents may suspect fraudulent activity, lack of evidence and fear of bad
faith lawsuits result in payment of meritless claims.'" During the survey
period, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of insurance fraud in Hays
v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co.'6
163. S. Leigh Moore, Comment, A Promising Alternative to Intent to Deceive: Intent to Induce
Issuance, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 273, 274-75 (1996).
164. Id. at 274.
165. Id. at 274-75.
166. Williams, supra note 153, at 296-97.
167. 192 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 1959).
168. Teeter, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
169. Id. at 615-16.
170. 811 P.2d 1202 (Kan. 1991).
171. Clay, 811 P.2dat 1207.
172. Moore, supra note 149, at 387-88.
173. Id. at 388.
174. Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Claims Fraud Problems and Remedies, 46 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 907,929 (1992).
175. Id. at 942-43.
176. 105 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997).
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B. Hays v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co.
1. Facts
Hays applied for a life insurance policy with Jackson National Life
Insurance Co. (Jackson National) in the fall of 1991.'" The application
form required information concerning his medical history.' A Jackson
National agent completed the medical history information section based
on Hays's responses. 9 Hays disclosed that he previously had an ulcer
which required surgical intervention, as well as some minor incidents in
his medical history.'" However, he neglected to mention he had serious
medical problems related to his esophagus.'8'
On November 8, 1991, Jackson National issued a life insurance
policy to Hays with a coverage amount of $500,000.2 On August 31,
1992, Hays died of esophageal cancer.' Upon submission of the claim,
Jackson National investigated Hays's medical history.'" It discovered
that Hays had been diagnosed with Barrett's Esophagus' 5 and, as a result,
received a significant amount of medical treatment.' Based on Hays's
failure to disclose this information, Jackson National denied coverage
under the policy and returned the premiums which Hays paid on the pol-
icy to Hays's estate."7
The beneficiaries of the policy sued, asserting claims for contractual
bad faith, outrage and reformation.'88 The district court dismissed all
claims.'" The plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
3. Decision
The Tenth Circuit looked to Oklahoma law to determine whether
Jackson National had the burden of proving an intent to deceive. 9' After
analyzing the pertinent statute and case law, the court concluded that a
177. Hays, 105 F.3d at 584.
178. Id.
179. Id.





185. Id. Barrets Esophagus is a change in esophageal tissue which results from repeated reflux




189. Id. at 584.
190. Id. at 586-87.
191. Id. at 587.
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company must prove this intent by the applicant in order to deny cover-
age.'
Title 36, section 3609 of the Oklahoma Statutes states that a com-
pany cannot rescind a policy unless the misrepresentation is either
fraudulent or material.'93 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the statute
could be read to mean that an insured's state of mind is irrelevant to a
determination of misrepresentation.'" It found, however, that Oklahoma
case law indicated otherwise.95
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Allen,'" the Okla-
homa Supreme Court defined misrepresentation as an untrue statement
made with the intent to deceive or mislead.'9" Because the supreme court
subsequently applied this "intent to deceive" requirement in Brunson v.
Mid-Western Life Insurance Co.'" and Claborn v. Washington National
Insurance Co., the Tenth Circuit concluded that Oklahoma law re-
quired proof of intent to deceive in order to rescind an insurance policy
on grounds of misrepresentation of material information on an applica-
tion."
The court noted that under Oklahoma law a statement made on an
insurance application without an intent to deceive is not misrepresenta-
tion." Although the court indicated that in this case the information
given on the application could have given rise to an inference of intent to
deceive, it could also have led to the conclusion that Hays did not intend
to deceive.' Because the court found that a material issue of fact existed
regarding whether Hays intended to deceive Jackson National, it reversed
the dismissal of the breach of contract claim.'
Refusing to allow incentives for fraudulent misrepresentation, the
court determined that beneficiaries are not entitled to reformation of a
policy to the amount of insurance that would have been issued had the
insurer known of the insured's true medical history.' The Tenth Circuit,
therefore, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the reformation
claim.'
192. Id. at 588.
193. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3609 (West 1990).
194. Hays, 105 F.3d at 587.
195. Id. at 587-88.
196. 416 P.2d 935 (Okla. 1965).
197. Allen, 416 P.2d at 940.
198. 547 P.2d 970, 973 (Okla. 1976).
199. 910 P.2d 1046, 1049-50 (Okla. 1996).
200. Hays, 105 F.3d at 588.
201. Id. at 588-89.
202. Id. at 589.
203. Id. at 589-90.




Plaintiffs argued that Jackson National acted unreasonably in issu-
ing the policy without first conducting an investigation into Hays' health.
Holding that the tort of bad faith breach of an insurance contract must be
based upon an insurer's wrongful denial of a claim, not upon the conduct
of an insurer in selling a policy, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of the bad faith claim.' The court also affirmed the lower court's dis-
missal of the outrage claim, finding that Jackson National acted reasona-
bly in issuing the policy without first conducting an investigation.'
C. Other Circuits
The Sixth Circuit addressed a fraudulent claim case in Massachu-
setts Casualty Insurance Co. v. Reynolds.2' In that case, the Navarre
Company purchased a disability insurance policy from Massachusetts
Casualty Insurance Company for each of its five or six employees. Na-
varre Company paid the premiums for each of the employee's policies
under a common billing invoice.2 ° Massachusetts Casualty gave Navarre
a discount on premiums so long as an individual policyholder continued
as an employee with Navarre and at least five employees carried similar
policies."' Under the policy terms, Navarre paid the premiums under a
common billing invoice unless and until an employee left the company,
at which time the employee had the option to pay his own premiums." 2
On October 17, 1989, Reynolds completed the required individual
application for disability coverage. 3 He failed to disclose certain pre-
existing conditions, including Meniere's Syndrome.2 ' Reynolds's em-
ployment with Navarre Company terminated on April 10, 1992.2' He
continued to pay the premiums himself.2 6 Approximately one month
later, Reynolds filed a claim for total disability based on a tentative diag-
nosis of multiple sclerosis. '
Massachusetts Casualty began making disability payments and in-
vestigated the claim.28 In the course of its investigation, Massachusetts
Casualty discovered the preexisting medical conditions.2 ' On September
206. Id.
207. Id. at 590-91.
208. 113 F.3d 1450 (6th Cir. 1997).
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15, 1992, it denied Reynolds's claim, based on his failure to disclose the
required information on the policy application." The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Massachusetts Casualty, entering
judgment for the difference in the benefits paid and the amount of premi-
ums accepted.22' Reynolds appealed to the Sixth Circuit."'2
The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district
court.' The court held that the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) governed the plaintiff's claims, preempting claims relating
to the agent's alleged misrepresentations.*2' The court further held that
whether the insured made the misstatements on the insurance application
with the requisite knowledge and intent to defraud constituted factual
questions, precluding summary judgment."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit properly reversed the district court's dismissal of
the breach of contract claim in Hays. Insurance contracts are contracts of
the utmost good faith." Because the rescission of a policy can result in
severe consequences for the policy holder,' proof of intent to deceive
should be required.
The existence of intent to deceive is generally a question of fact for
the jury.' Because Hays provided information on comparatively unim-
portant medical information, but failed to reveal his previously diagnosed
medical problems, a reasonable person could conclude that he intended
to deceive the insurance carrier.' The Tenth Circuit therefore correctly
held that a finding of intent to deceive should have come from a jury of
peers."0
Requiring the insurer to prove intent to deceive before a jury, how-
ever, results in costly litigation." Faced with this requirement, insurance
carriers are forced to weigh the costs and risks of litigation against the
potential payout on a suspected fraudulent claim." Insurance carriers
may tend to pay out on fraudulent claims rather than fight them. There-
fore, potential policyholders may find little disincentive against perpe-
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1453.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1456.
224. Id. at 1453.
225. Id. at 1456.
226. 6 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 81-37 (Lee R. Russ ed., 3d ed. 1997).
227. See Wiker & Lenci, supra note 157, at 224.
228. 6 COUCH, supra note 226, at 81-123.
229. Hays v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 583, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1997).
230. Id.
231. Id.; see also Moore, supra note 163, at 274-75 (explaining that courts cannot dispose of
costly litigation at summary judgment because of the requirement to show intent to deceive).
232. See Moore, supra note 163, at 274.
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trating fraud. Evidence shows that the public perceives that the likeli-
hood of being caught committing fraud is slim and that the consequences
of fraud are insignificant. " Nevertheless, the cost of insurance fraud ul-
timately shifts to innocent consumers.23
V. POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSES
A. Background
Comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance policies are de-
signed to protect the insured against liability arising from damages
caused by the insured's actions." Such policies have traditionally pro-
vided insureds with the broadest coverage against third party claims.'
CGL policies typically impose a duty on the carrier to defend any suit
against the insured seeking damages resulting from actions covered by
the policy. 7 This duty is broader than the insurer's obligation to provide
coverage. 8 Many courts have found a duty to defend so long as the claim
could conceivably fall within the policy's coverage."
Prior to 1966, most CGL insurance policies covered bodily injury
and property damage resulting from accidents. 2' During that time, the
courts construed the term "accident" very broadly, which often resulted
in coverage for long-term exposure to harmful conditions or
substances.2 '
The insurance industry introduced the pollution exclusion clause in
1970."2 As a result of increasing environmental concerns and disasters,
many insurance carriers included pollution exclusion clauses in their
CGL policies which exempted coverage to knowing polluters. " Begin-
ning in about 1973, insurers broadened the pollution exclusion to apply
to most environmental contamination causes, except those that were
"sudden and accidental. ' "
233. Schrenk & Palmquist, supra note 150, at 24.
234. Id.
235. Timothy M. Gebhart, A "Timeless" Interpretation of the "Sudden and Accidental"
Exception to the Pollution Exclsuion?, 41 S.D. L. REV. 314, 315 (1996).
236. David W. Steuber, Overview of Environmental Claims and Insurance Coverage Litigation
Under Comprehensive General Liability, in INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES 3,
4 (Lynne M. Miller & Mary J. Mallonee eds., 1989).
237. Irene A. Sullivan et al., Hazardous Waste Litigation: Comprehensive General Liability
Insurance Coverage Issues, in INSURANCE, EXCESS, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 1992,
at 203, 209 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series NO. 427, 1992).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 206.
241. Id. at 206-07.
242. Gebhart, supra note 235, at 316.
243. Id. at 316-17.
244. Id. at 315-17.
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Because the policies did not define "sudden and accidental," exten-
sive litigation ensued. " The courts split on what constituted a "sudden"
occurrence. " The insurance industry argued that the term "sudden" has a
temporal component, requiring that the polluting discharge occur
abruptly and quickly. 7 The policyholders contended that the terms "sud-
den" and "accidental" are ambiguous, requiring construction in their fa-
vor.
24
Although courts interpreted "sudden and accidental" in a variety of
ways, they have developed three common approaches. "9 First, courts may
find the terminology ambiguous and construe it against the insurer.'
Second, some courts define "sudden and accidental" to mean unexpected
and unintended, thereby allowing coverage for pollution events that oc-
cur over a relatively long period of time."' Third, some courts interpret
the phrase as limiting coverage that would otherwise be granted under
the term "occurrence." ' Courts in this latter category will often find a
temporal element in the meaning of "sudden" and separately define "ac-
cidental" as "unintended." '
The Tenth Circuit decided a case on this issue in Quaker State
Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,' where a distributor
of used oil sought insurance coverage when the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) identified the company as a potentially responsible
party (PRP) for contamination at a used oil processing facility owned by
Ekotek, Inc.' 5 The Tenth Circuit concluded that oil which Quaker State
Minit-Lube, Inc. (Minit-Lube) sold to Ekotek, and which contaminated
the Ekotek plant, constituted pollution.' It also found that the "sudden
and accidental" exemption in Ekotek's policy did not apply because the
contamination was long-term and gradual, and that the question of
whether the pollution was "sudden and accidental" should be considered
from Ekotek's perspective, rather than that of Minit-Lube.n? The Tenth
245. Id. at 317-18.
246. See Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 123 F.3d 1333, 1339 (10th Cir. 1997)
(listing the different cases interpreting the "sudden and accidental" meaning).
247. See Sharon M. Murphy, Note, The "Sudden and Accidental" Exception to the Pollution
Exclusion Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The Gordian Knot of
Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L. REV. 161, 168-69 (1992).
248. Mesa Oil, 123 F.3d at 1339.
249. See Murphy, supra note 247, at 178-79.




254. 52 F.3d 1522 (10th Cir. 1995).
255. Minit-Lube, 52 F.3d at 1525.
256. Id. at 1530.
257. Id. at 1530-31. The pollution at the Ekotek plant was continuous and part of its regular




Circuit revisited this issue during the survey period in Mesa Oil, Inc. v.
Insurance Co. of North America. 8
B. Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America
1. Facts
Mesa Oil, Inc., an oil recycler, sold twelve shipments of lubricant
feedstock processed from used oil to Ekotek, Inc., expecting Ekotek to
refine and resell the oil. 9 Ekotek, however, stored the oil at its Utah fa-
cility for several years, mishandling it as well as oil purchased from
many other sources." This mishandling led to high levels of soil and
groundwater contamination, which resulted in the facility being declared
a superfund clean-up site."' Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),262 companies
which the EPA determines to be potentially responsible parties (PRPs)
for contamination at a site are jointly and severally liable for cleanup and
response costs." The EPA identified Mesa Oil as one of the PRPs for the
Ekotek site.2"
On October 21, 1994, Mesa Oil settled its liability claim with the
EPA. 65 However, on May 24, 1994, a group of other PRPs named Mesa
Oil as a defendant in a lawsuit seeking contribution toward the costs of
the investigation and cleanup at the Ekotek site.26 At this time, Mesa Oil
sought defense and indemnification from its insurer, Insurance Company
of North America (INA), for both the claims brought by EPA and the
group of PRPs.2 7 INA carried Mesa Oil's CGL insurance during the time
period in question.' INA denied Mesa Oil's coverage request based on a
pollution exclusion in Mesa Oil's policyY
Mesa Oil sued INA in a New Mexico state court."' INA removed
the case from state court and transferred it to the federal district court for
the district of Utah."' The district court granted INA's motion for sum-
mary judgment." Mesa Oil appealed to the Tenth Circuit."
258. 123 F.3d 1333 (10th Cir. 1997).
259. Mesa Oil, 123 F.3d at 1335.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657).
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2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit analyzed Mesa Oil's contention that this case
differed from Quaker State because New Mexico courts interpret insur-
ance policies more liberally than Utah courts. '4 Mesa Oil argued that
New Mexico courts would not apply the pollution exclusion contained in
its policy with INA to its sale of oil to Ekotek on the ground that selling
oil was Mesa Oil's primary activity and it was that activity that INA
contracted to insure.275 Mesa Oil contended that under New Mexico law,
a policy exclusion is repugnant to an insuring clause when it simply nul-
lifies the purpose of the policy." The court disagreed and held that the
policy was not null because the exclusion did not eliminate all coverage
arising out of Mesa Oil's selling of oil."'
The second issue the court addressed involved the application of the
"sudden and accidental" exemption of the policy exclusion.27" Mesa Oil
argued that the "sudden and accidental" requirement should be viewed
from the insured's standpoint, rather from that of the polluter. ' Applying
New Mexico law, the Tenth Circuit found that a New Mexico court
would attribute the plain meaning to unambiguous words in a policy.'
The court found the words "sudden and accidental" to apply to pollution
that occurs quickly and abruptly. "
The court listed three distinct rationales for its interpretation of the
word "sudden" in the policy exemption." First, the court found that the
plain meaning of the word "sudden" contains a temporal component."
Second, it found that because insurance policies typically state whether
the facts may be evaluated from the insured's perspective, the fact that
INA's policy did not contain such language precluded the court from
evaluating the facts from Mesa Oil's perspective. ' Finally, the court
referred to a New Mexico Supreme Court decision stating that the su-
preme court would enforce the plain language of insurance contracts."
However, New Mexico courts generally allow a party to introduce ex-
trinsic evidence of a contract's meaning to determine whether an ambi-
guity exists.' Because Mesa Oil failed to provide sufficient evidence to
overcome the plain meaning interpretation of the pollution exclusion, the
274. Id. at 1337.
275. Id. at 1337-38.
276. Id. at 1338.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1339.
279. Id.









Tenth Circuit rejected Mesa Oil's contention that the term "sudden," as
used in its policy with INA, was ambiguous."'
Under New Mexico law, the insurer's duty to defend is distinct from
its duty to indemnify. 8 Mesa Oil argued that such a duty exists when the
complaint alleges facts which potentially fall within the policy
coverage. ' However, because the court found that there was no potential
coverage based on the facts alleged, it held that INA had no duty to de-
fend.'
C. Other Circuits
The Fifth Circuit also interpreted a pollution exclusion clause during
the survey period in SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Century Indemnity Co."m In
1982, SnyderGeneral Corporation purchased the assets of Singer Com-
pany's Climate Control Division, which included a manufacturing facil-
ity in North Carolina.' SnyderGeneral utilized the facility to manufac-
ture air conditioning and heating equipment between the years 1982 and
198 8 .3 The company used industrial degreasing solvent trichloroethane
(TCA) and groundwater in the manufacturing process. '
In 1983, approximately 500 gallons of TCA spilled at the facility.'
By the date of the opinion, SnyderGeneral paid approximately $2 million
toward cleanup costs resulting from the spill.' SnyderGeneral sought
coverage from its primary CGL policy with Union Insurance Company
(Union) and its excess coverage carrier, Century Indemnity Company
(Century)." Century denied coverage.'
SnyderGeneral brought suit in Texas state court.' Century removed
the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment."° The district
court concluded that the environmental cleanup costs did not constitute
damages under the policy and that Century was not responsible for the
reimbursement of expenses incurred."' SnyderGeneral appealed to the
Fifth Circuit.'w




291. 113 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 1997).
292. SnyderGeneral, 113 F.3d at 537.
293. Id. at 537-38.








302. Id. at 537.
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On appeal, Century reiterated its argument that the term "damages"
in its policy referred to the technical distinction between legal damages
and equitable relief" , It argued that because the cleanup costs resembled
restitution or reimbursement, they did not constitute "damages" under the
policy terms."' The Fifth Circuit disagreed and held that environmental
cleanup costs constituted damages and, therefore, were covered under the
policy.3"
Century further contended that neither the pollution exclusion
clause nor the care, custody and control exclusion clause of SnyderGen-
eral's policy with Union precluded recovery."' The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding that the term "sudden" in the pollution exclu-
sion clause had a temporal component.' Because a question of fact ex-
isted as to the suddenness of the spill, as well as to the total and physical
use or control of the groundwater, the court held that summary judgment
was not appropriate.3"
The Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar issue in LaFarge Corp. v.
Travelers Indemnity Corp.3 " In that case, General Portland, Inc. (GPI)
contracted with Jernigan Trucking Company (Jernigan) to haul waste
from its cement manufacturing sites."' Jernigan promised GPI that it
would haul the waste to a proper landfill."" However, Jernigan diverted
the waste to a site which did not properly contain the waste, and which
became the target of an EPA investigation.' LaFarge Corporation ac-
quired GPI in 1983.' In 1988, the EPA notified LaFarge that it was in-
vestigating LaFarge as a generator of toxic waste at the site where Jerni-
gan had deposited GPI's waste materials."' In 1990, the EPA named La-
Farge as a party potentially responsible for the pollution cleanup costs." '
LaFarge notified its insurer, Travelers Indemnity Co. (Travelers), of
the potential charges."'6 Travelers denied coverage based on its pollution
exclusion clauses. 7 LaFarge brought suit against Travelers and other
insurance carriers seeking a declaration that the insurers had a duty to
303. Id. at 538.
304. Id.




309. 118 F.3d 1511 (l th Cir. 1997).






316. Id. at 1514.
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defend and indemnify it against the EPA's claims."8 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.3 9 LaFarge ap-
pealed to the Eleventh Circuit."l
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit followed Florida law.32' Because the
initial deposits of waste at the site took place over five or six months and
the subsequent seepage took place over several years, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's finding that such disposal was not "sud-
den" under the policy terms."' Further, the court rejected LaFarge's con-
tentions that the pollution exclusion was ambiguous and that it created an
absolute exclusion in contravention of the terms of the pertinent
policies."
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Mesa Oil represents the trend of
pollution exclusion interpretations at the appellate level. Many courts
have rejected the ambiguity argument and relied on a much more fact-
specific analysis which concentrates on whether a business accused of
polluting knew or should have known about the pollution."' This ap-
proach has resulted in almost evenly split outcomes." Such fact-specific
analysis results in a lack of predictability and consistency in judicial de-
cisions.326
The policy reasons for upholding pollution exclusions are clear.
Allowing insurance coverage for liability incurred from negligent or
careless spills or releases would discourage policyholders from taking
sufficient precautions against environmental contamination."' An insured
would be even more likely to relax his vigilance if he knows that the
deposit or release of toxic waste or pollutants would be covered, so long
as such a deposit or release was unexpected." Coverage exclusions for
unexpected contamination create an incentive for a business to prevent
environmental harm."
Despite the public policy incentive to discourage relaxed vigilance,




321. Id. at 1515.
322. Id. at 1517.
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in effective cleanup of contaminated sites." The costs of cleanup and the
financial viability of both the insured and insurer may be factors which
courts consider in determining whether an insurer is liable for
coverage."' Because pollution damage may take years to discover, cur-
rent decisions potentially have a significant impact on future disputes."'
Although the federal courts appear to have generally supported the
insurers by interpreting "sudden and accidental" according to its plain
meaning, the onslaught of litigation over the meaning of the term has
resulted in a change of policy wording. ' The typical CGL policy now
carries an absolute pollution exclusion.3 However, the litigation in this
area is far from over. Discovering contamination takes time. Thus, courts
will continue to wrestle with the meaning of "sudden and accidental" in
CGL policies.
CONCLUSION
During the 1996-97 survey period, the Tenth Circuit held in Adams
v. Royal Indemnity Co. that the MCS-90 Endorsement can expand cover-
age on an automobile policy by redefining the policy's definition of an
insured.3 This finding is inconsistent with prior interpretations of the
endorsement and a factually similar Ninth Circuit case decided after Ad-
ams.
In Houston General Insurance Co. v. American Fence Co.,336 the
Tenth Circuit determined that the plaintiff's personal truck did not con-
stitute a temporary substitute vehicle, because the covered vehicle was
not out of service at the time of use." In Hays v. Jackson National Life
Insurance Co.,"8 the Tenth Circuit ruled that Oklahoma law required
proof of an intent to deceive in order to rescind the policy based on mis-
representations on the policy application. 9
Finally, in Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America,' the
Tenth Circuit interpreted for the first time a pollution exclusion clause
under New Mexico law. The Tenth Circuit upheld the exclusion on the
ground that it did not eliminate all coverage under a basic policy and
because the pollution problem in this case was not "sudden and acciden-
330. Murphy, supra note 247, at 192.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. See generally Burke, supra note 324, at 465-66 (describing the redrafting of the pollution
exclusion as a result of increased litigation).
334. Id. at 466.
335. 99 F.3d 964, 971 (10th Cir. 1996).
336. 115 F.3d 805 (10th Cir. 1997).
337. Houston, 115 F.3d at 808.
338. 105 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997).
339. Hays, 105 F.3d at 588.
340. 123 F.3d 1333 (10th Cir. 1997).
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tal."34' This finding was consistent with a factually similar case, Minit-
Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., that the Tenth Circuit de-
cided in 1995.2
Sharon Cohen Collier
341. Mesa Oil, 123 F.3d at 1341.
342. See Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522, 1524 (10th
Cir. 1995).
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